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Abstract: 
 In my lifetime, the accounting industry has experienced many downfalls. Due to the 
myriad of scandals that rocked America’s marketplace in the 2000’s, accountants and investors 
alike saw the need for reworking within the industry. With this desire for change came the 
passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law on July 30, 2002.  
 The purpose of the project is to explore the accounting scandals that took place prior to 
enacting Sarbanes-Oxley. Although it is important to acknowledge that there were other 
accounting scandals that took place, such as Tyco, HealthSouth, Freddie Mac, this paper focuses 
specifically on the Enron and WorldCom scandals and how these two scandals played a large 
role in the need for and creation of Sarbanes-Oxley. By studying the environment of these 
businesses that led to their fraud, one can see a direct correlation between the issues at Enron and 
WorldCom and how SOX was designed to prevent those issues at other publicly traded 
companies. 
 This project also contains interviews with people connected to and affected by the 
passing of SOX. The first person I interviewed is Dr. Joseph Carcello. Dr. Carcello is the 
Accounting and Information Management Department Head at The University of Tennessee, 
Knoxville. He also has served on the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)’s 
Standing Advisory Group, and he currently is a charter member of the PCAOB’s Investor 
Advisory Group. The second person that I interviewed for this project is Barry Elkins who 
worked 12 years in the public accounting industry and later became the CFO and Senior Vice 
President of Direct General Corporation. He held his position at Direct General when the 
company went public in 2003, thus has firsthand experience with the changes that were 
implemented with the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
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Introduction: 
 Prior to the accounting scandals of the 2000’s, the accounting industry was mostly a self-
regulated industry. Although the SEC had entrusted its authority to set accounting standards to 
FASB, auditors were a self-regulated group governed solely by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants’ (AICPA) auditing standards.  However, the scandals that took 
place, such as Enron and WorldCom, revealed deeply hidden issues within American businesses 
and the accounting profession in general. According to Paul Krugman of The New York Times, 
“the Enron debacle is not just the story of a company that failed; it is the story of a system that 
failed. And the system didn’t fail through carelessness or laziness; it was corrupted.” Although 
the stories of accounting fraud and corruption are mostly the exception, not the rule, the need for 
changes within the accounting industry became indisputable when the world began to see the 
destruction that the scandals caused with regard to the average American. People all across the 
country were suffering at the hands of overpaid, overzealous executives of some of the largest 
companies in America.  
 The Enron scandal alone cost thousands of employees and investors their retirement 
account, shareholders lost $74 billion, and the employees were all let go. With the WorldCom 
scandal, 300,000 jobs were lost and investors saw losses of $180 million (“The 10 Worst 
Corporate Accounting Scandals of All Time”). With similar numbers seen in every major 
accounting scandal, the need for changes within the industry could not be ignored any longer. On 
July 30, 2002, congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act with the hopes of regaining the 
confidence of investors worldwide and decreasing the possibility of the American markets being 
devastated by scandals again.  
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Business Industry Before Scandals and SOX: 
 Prior to the accounting scandals, the American marketplace was booming. The American 
people felt as though they could not lose by investing in the stock market. It appeared as though 
America, the people and the country, could not fail. Within the public accounting industry there 
was almost zero regulation from outside of the profession entrusting auditors with a great deal of 
power and responsibility (Garner 17). Accounting firms audited/regulated each other, which led 
to an “I’ll scratch your back, if you scratch mine” relationship (Carcello). The absence of outside 
regulation also led to the firms emphasizing their consulting practices over any other department 
(Garner 17). With this lack of regulation, also came a deep intertwining between the firms and 
the corporations they audited. The close relationships between auditors and clients were partially 
attributed to years of continuous auditing (sometimes close to 20 years). This fact is, without a 
doubt, a major factor in the downfall of Arthur Andersen, one of what was then the “Big 5” 
accounting firms. The “Big 5” consisted of: Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG Peat Marwick, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. Within this group, each firm was 
regarded as extremely trustworthy, as well as knowledgeable within the accounting industry. In 
fact, according to Public Broadcasting Services (PBS), Arthur Andersen was “once known as the 
gold standard of integrity in auditing” (“Bigger Than Enron”). All of that changed, however, 
with the fall of Enron.  
 
Enron and Arthur Andersen: 
Enron Corporation was a company based out of Houston, Texas that was established in 
1985 and focused its business on a number of different commodities related to energy (Messier 
712). By the 1990’s, Enron had become one of largest companies in America making it an 
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extremely attractive company in the stock market. In 2001, Enron was ranked #5 on the Fortune 
500 listing; then in a drastic turn, during that same year, Enron filed for bankruptcy citing a third 
quarter loss of $618 million and a $1.2 billion reduction in owner’s equity. This abrupt change in 
Enron’s profitability prompted the SEC’s official investigation of the company. The 
investigation led to Enron announcing that the company had overstated its profits by $586 
million over the last 5 years, essentially wiping out all its profits. Through their investigation, the 
SEC discovered an alarming amount of accounting errors in Enron’s books, which led the SEC, 
as well as the public, to question the reliability of Enron’s executives and their auditor, Arthur 
Andersen.  
Enron hid their internal problems extremely well until the company began its downward 
spiral. One of Enron’s biggest issues was weak internal controls throughout the company, which 
enabled its executives to perpetrate fraud. Furthermore, the company’s management did not 
contain men of high integrity or character. Since the fraud at Enron has been exposed, former 
employees have said that Kenneth Lay, the company’s CEO, did not like to pay attention to the 
details of management. These details that he believed to be unimportant were, in fact, material 
and greatly impacted Enron’s survival in the marketplace (Bierman 41). Enron also favored 
aggressive accounting practices. The aggressiveness of these practices were so intense that it 
prompted an anonymous letter to Lay stating that because of Enron’s questionable accounting 
methods, the writer feared that Enron would “implode in a wave of accounting scandals” 
(Bierman 42). After the fraud at Enron became publically know, Sherron Watkins, a vice 
president for Corporate Development at Enron, admitted to being the letter’s author. While so 
many issues were transpiring and being questioned internally, the outside world only saw 
Enron’s false financial statements, thus viewed Enron as a thriving company.  
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Since 1986, Arthur Andersen had been auditing Enron. Because of the long-standing 
relationship between the companies, Robert Bryce claims that by the end of the 1990’s, Arthur 
Andersen was extremely reliant on Enron as a client, so much so that the firm could not have 
survived without Enron as a client (237). This revelation alone potentially explains why so much 
“escaped” the auditors at Arthur Andersen. During my interview of Dr. Joseph Carcello, he 
explained that Arthur Andersen had just experienced a separation with Andersen Consulting, 
which made the firm extremely vulnerable. With the loss of its consulting practice, an extremely 
profitable part of the firm, Arthur Andersen created its own consulting function within the firm. 
The creation of this consulting function led to a greater emphasis on that and less of an emphasis 
on auditing and its professional standards. According to Barbara Ley Toffler, after the split of 
Andersen Consulting and Arthur Andersen, the “mantra of the day” became “perform or get 
purged” (69). Toffler suggests that it was this type of firm culture that led to Andersen 
employees allowing Enron to commit fraud. Due to the split of the firms, Toffler claims that an 
excessive amount of energy and time was spent on the firm’s feelings of frustration and rage 
against their former sister company that could have and should have otherwise been focused on 
seeing the misconduct of clients (70).  
Although Arthur Andersen is not the only one to blame for Enron’s ability to commit 
fraud, the accounting firm did play a large role. A major downfall of the firm was that it did not 
keep Enron’s board aware of their concerns regarding Enron’s financials. The auditors were 
aware that Enron possessed a large amount of risk that the public was not knowledgeable of, but 
made no attempt to rectify that (Bierman 136). Although a good number of the misstatements on 
Enron’s financials were due to genuinely inadvertent errors, many of the errors were a 
ramification of large-scale fraud and collapse of auditing standards and policies (Garner 7). The 
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biggest failing and the one that sealed Arthur Andersen’s failure as an accounting firm was their 
shredding of documents after the fraud at Enron was exposed. Knowing that the firm would be 
investigated, David Duncan, a partner on the Enron account, advised several Andersen 
employees to begin the shredding of documents relating to the fraud at Enron (Toffler 214-216). 
Once the firm admitted to their shredding of documents, Arthur Andersen became the focal point 
of America’s hatred, which ultimately led to the firm having to shut its doors on August 31, 2002 
(“Arthur Andersen Goes Out of Business”).  
 
WorldCom and Arthur Andersen: 
 Shortly after the fall of Enron, WorldCom, a large telecommunications company based 
out of Mississippi had its fraud exposed, resulting in the largest bankruptcy in United States’ 
history. The fraud at WorldCom was a product of CEO Bernie Ebbers’s business strategy of 
acquisitions, which led to the company having $41 billion in debt (Romero and Atlas). One of 
the primary differences between the fraud at Enron and the fraud at WorldCom was the difficulty 
of execution. The WorldCom fraud was exceedingly simple.  
Starting in 1998 until 2000, WorldCom continuously decreased its “reserve accounts held 
to cover liabilities of acquired companies” (AICPA). By doing so over those two years, the 
company managed to increase its revenues by $2.8 billion; however, this alone became 
insufficient to save the company and keep its investors happy, thus in December of 2000, an 
email was sent to a WorldCom office in Texas from the CFO instructing them to misclassify the 
company’s operating expenses as long-term investments. The CFO’s instruction to misclassify 
these expenses was a command worth $3.85 billion, which drastically increased WorldCom’s net 
income and their earnings per share (AICPA). Despite these large adjustments to WorldCom’s 
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financials, it was not until 2002 that WorldCom’s internal auditors began to look into the 
accounting practices that had taken place over the past four years. With more and more 
questionable accounting being discovered in WorldCom’s wireless division, Cynthia Cooper, 
WorldCom’s Vice President of Internal Audit, began searching for documents to support the 
company’s accounting decisions. After the internal audit team at WorldCom discovered more 
unusual entries, Cooper decided to contact WorldCom’s external auditor, Arthur Andersen, 
where she was told by an Andersen partner that “any aggressive accounting entries in wireless 
[were] balanced out on a corporationwide basis” (Farrell). After this talk, Cooper was contacted 
by WorldCom’s CFO, Scott Sullivan, telling her not to speak to the company’s external auditor 
about these accounting entries again, leading Cooper to the realization that fraud was present 
within her company and she needed to expose it (Farrell).   
Although the executives at WorldCom did a relatively good job at covering their 
fraudulent activity, according to CRN, because the fraud at WorldCom was so basic, there is no 
excuse as to why Arthur Andersen did not catch the fraud. This extensive auditing oversight is 
what led to Arthur Anderson’s demise (“Arthur Andersen at Center of Scandal Again”). It was 
“the WorldCom debacle [that] demolished what was left of Arthur Andersen’s reputation” (Jeter 
207).   
 
Implementation of SOX: 
 After the myriad of accounting frauds that took place in the early 2000’s, investors 
throughout the world needed a reason to trust American companies and auditors again. With the 
failing of Enron and WorldCom alone, investors lost around 254 billion dollars and about 
320,000 employees lost their jobs (Ferrell). With numbers as staggering as these, the need for 
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reform within the business industry was unquestionable. According to Robert Mueller, “the 
collapse of Enron was devastating to tens of thousands of people and shook the public’s 
confidence in corporate America.”  Not only did the frauds expose major financial statement 
errors that needed to be addressed, it also uncovered a major issue with regard to the morals of 
executives. Even after the Enron fraud was exposed, Kenneth Lay claimed that he did nothing 
criminal. Based on what Arthur Andersen allowed Enron and WorldCom to get away with, it 
was abundantly clear that “none of the checks and balances that were supposed to prevent insider 
abuse worked; the supposedly independent players were compromised” (Krugman).  
 All of the issues that were uncovered with regard to both business and accounting pointed 
to one obvious action- change needed to happen, and it needed to happen fast. With that in mind, 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 into law, which is regarded as “the most 
sweeping set of new business regulations since the 1930’s (“The 10 Worst Corporate Accounting 
Scandals of All Time”).  
 
Breakdown of the Sections of SOX: 
 Within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there are 11 titles, all of which address certain 
shortcomings of the accounting industry that were exposed during the fraud investigations. Title 
I establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). With the 
establishment of the PCAOB came the end of self-regulation in the accounting industry. Title I 
establishes the PCAOB as a non-governmental entity, but it is overseen by the SEC (Ayers 3). 
As was seen with regard to Arthur Andersen’s involvement in both the Enron and WorldCom 
frauds, accounting firms had too much power and not enough outside regulation, which allowed 
them to push the limits of their autonomy. Currently, all public accounting firms are required to 
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register with the PCAOB, and their audits are subject to random inspection. That said, the 
PCAOB is the primary oversight body for public accounting firms.  
Auditor Independence is the subject Title II. A major reason why Enron was able to hide 
their fraud from the public was their close relationship with Arthur Andersen. The client and firm 
were so intertwined that Arthur Andersen auditors and consultants had permanent offices at 
Enron’s headquarters. The auditors also participated in Enron’s employee ski trips to Colorado 
(Herrick and Barrionuevo).  The goal of an auditor is to give the public an unbiased opinion on a 
company’s financial statements; however, when auditors and clients have this close of a 
relationship, it is hard to believe that anything the auditor reports is unbiased. Title II attempts to 
restore the trust in an auditor’s opinion by restoring the necessary independence. This section 
limits the types of services that an external auditor can perform for its clients. It also limits the 
amount of time that auditors can work on a specific company. David Duncan, the partner in 
charge of Enron’s audit, worked on this audit for five years, had an office in Enron’s building, 
and he and Enron’s chief accounting officer were extremely friendly outside the office 
(Raghavan).  
 Title III addresses corporate responsibility. With this title, all public companies are 
required to create an independent audit committee that is charged with hiring the external 
auditor, paying the auditors, overseeing the auditors, and dealing with any issues that may arise. 
Keeping the audit committee independent of management allows the auditor to have a group to 
report to if any unethical behavior arises. For example, according to a former Enron executive, in 
a meeting once with an auditor from Arthur Andersen, Enron needed an opinion letter from the 
firm supporting their claim for $270 million in tax credits. Although the auditor at first refused, 
the Enron employees made it apparent that they would not let the auditor leave until they 
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received the opinion letter they wanted (Garner 12). In situations such as these, the auditor now 
has an independent party that ideally will support them with decisions such as the one above. 
This title also forces the CEO and CFO to take a greater responsibility with regard to the 
company’s financial statements. These two executives must certify for both quarterly and annual 
reports that they have examined the reports and believe that the financials are a fair 
representation of the company’s financial position. Another major provision of this title is that if 
the CEO and CFO certify the financial statements, but later the financials must be reissued 
because of noncompliance with GAAP, they must return any bonuses that they obtained a year 
after the restatement of the financials.  This should alleviate any incentives that executives may 
have to falsely adjust their company’s financials.  
 The fourth title concentrates on enhanced financial disclosures. After the fall of Enron 
and WorldCom, a similar weakness in internal controls was discovered at both companies. This 
weakness undoubtedly played a role in the company’s ability to hide fraud for the amount of 
time that they did (Bainbridge 155). To resolve that issue, Congress decided with the passing of 
SOX that both managers and auditors must assess a public company’s internal controls. The 
company must also disclose any material adjustments determined by the auditor. This will allow 
for additional transparency between the company and its investors. 
 Title V discusses analysts’ conflicts of interest. The need for analysts to be truly 
independent and unbiased came about after Jack Grubman, a well-known Wall Street analyst, 
admitted that he rated WorldCom’s stock too high for too long (Ferrell 3). Jack Grubman was 
known to be close with the WorldCom CEO, and so with this admission came the scrutiny of 
investors and the SEC wondering if Grubman was a little too close to the telecommunications 
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company (4). This section also requires that analysts disclose to the public any potential conflicts 
of interest (Ayers 10). 
 Under Title VI, which discusses commission resources and authority, the SEC is to hire 
two hundred professionals whose job it will be to monitor the accounting profession. 
Additionally, this title increases the funding that the SEC was previously receiving. With the 
extra employees and money, the goal is to have better oversight of auditors, auditor practices, 
and the accounting profession in general (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). 
 Studies and reports is the focus of Title VII. Under this title, the General Accounting 
Office (GAO) and the SEC shall perform five studies. Those studies and their reports will be 
focused on the consolidation of public accounting firms, credit rating agencies, violators and 
violations within the profession, enforcement actions, and investment banks (Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002). The goal of these studies is to give both the GAO and the SEC a better 
understanding of factors that in the past may have led to fraudulent activity and factors that, in 
the future, may contribute to the presence of fraud.  
 Title VIII, which covers corporate and criminal fraud accountability, details the 
punishments and penalties for violating any laws. This section increases the maximum 
sentencing to twenty years for anyone that “alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, 
falsifies, or makes a false entry” in any documents or papers that may be used as evidence within 
an investigation. This section directly correlates with the shredding of Enron documents by 
Arthur Andersen employees (Toffler 214-216).  On top of that, this title requires external 
auditors to maintain documents that are relevant to their audits for a minimum of 5 years, and if 
the auditor fails to do so, he may be imprisoned for a maximum of ten years (Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002). This title also focuses on the protection of whistleblowers. Whistleblowers played 
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an incredibility vital role in the exposure of the fraud at both Enron and WorldCom. Without the 
help of Cynthia Cooper (WorldCom) and Sherron Watkins (Enron), the fraud at these companies 
may not have been discovered when it was, and because of their importance, this section enacts a 
maximum imprisonment of ten years to any person that intentionally retaliates against a 
whistleblower.  
 Title IX addresses white-collar crime penalty enhancements. This title dramatically 
increases the maximum imprisonment time for criminal activities, increasing it from five to 
twenty-five years. This section also introduces punishments for CEO’s and CFO’s that certify 
financials that do not meet the requirements laid out in Sarbanes-Oxley (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002).  
 Title X covers corporate tax returns, requiring that a company’s CEO sign the income tax 
return (Ayers 13). 
 The final section of SOX, Title XI: corporate fraud and accountability, details directions 
for a company to follow if it is under review for violations. This title gives a maximum of twenty 
years sentencing for anyone who impedes an official investigation (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002). It also allows the SEC to prevent companies from making any abnormal payments to 
executives during the company’s period of investigation. 
 
Interviews about SOX Today:  
 Twelve years after the passing of SOX into law, there are many varying opinions on what 
SOX has done for the American business world. To gain an understanding of the varying 
opinions on this act, it is imperative to talk to accountants who have had a first-hand experience 
with the changes implemented by Sarbanes-Oxley.  
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As previously stated, Dr. Joseph Carcello has served on multiple PCAOB advisory 
groups, thus has an incredible understanding about what the PCAOB desires Sarbanes-Oxley to 
accomplish, and what it actually has accomplished. According to Dr. Carcello, during the period 
of the Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and HealthSouth scandals, he said, “it felt like there was a fraud 
a week.” Having so many frauds come out at once showed a “systematic failure within the audit 
profession” (Carcello). When asked what he believed to be the reason that these companies were 
able to perform fraudulent activities for quite some time, he said that he believed it was “the 
perfect storm.” According to Dr. Carcello, because large-scale fraud is relatively rare, it is hard 
to find. “If a senior management team wants to commit fraud, it is pretty easy because the audit 
committee and external auditors trust management. If they didn’t, they wouldn’t be there” 
(Carcello). Not only that, but the issues at Enron and WorldCom transpired around the same time 
that their auditor Arthur Andersen’s consulting practice was splitting from the firm. Losing their 
consulting practice made Arthur Andersen start to focus more on the building of a new 
consulting practice, than they did on auditing, which lead to some low quality auditing 
(Carcello). Dr. Carcello believes that Sarbanes-Oxley was implemented for three main purposes: 
to remove self-regulation from the public accounting industry, to impose greater responsibility 
on senior executives of companies, and to provide a greater responsibility and obligation on the 
audit committee. When asked if he believes that SOX has accomplished all that it set out to, he 
says, “I think things are clearly better. The PCAOB has made improvements in focusing the 
firms on auditing. The attention and resources that auditing gets has improved, but it probably 
hasn’t been enough.” He claims that companies would say that since the passage of SOX, the 
financial qualities have improved and internal controls are better since management, as well as 
the external auditor, has to issue a separate opinion on a company’s system of internal controls. 
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Although he does admit that the discussion of the cost versus the benefits of the implementation 
of SOX is a completely different conversation. According to Dr. Carcello, although Sarbanes-
Oxley has accomplished a lot in its first twelve years, “there are problems that are still happening 
that need to be resolved” (Carcello). 
Barry Elkins has seen audits from the side of an auditor in a public accounting firm, as 
well as from an executive of a public corporation being audited. With these experiences have 
come a deep understanding of the way in which audits work and a greater awareness of the 
standards to which the accounting profession holds its members. Although Mr. Elkins agrees that 
there were issues within the accounting industry, he does not think that the passing of Sarbanes-
Oxley was necessary. He believes that if the internal control standards that were already in place 
had been properly enforced, there would have been no reason to pass SOX. According to Mr. 
Elkins, “SOX didn’t add anything. Legitimate companies were already doing 95% of everything 
that SOX implemented.” In his opinion, the only change that came about with SOX was its 
increasing the cost of an audit by hundreds of thousands of dollars. At Direct General, the 
implementation of SOX increased their audit cost by at least $100,000 (Elkins). When asked 
about whether he believed having the executives of a company sign off on the company’s 
financials was beneficial, Mr. Elkins responded by saying, “adding a signature from the CEO 
and CFO to attest that everything was done was useless. It was just so they could sue us. If 
someone was going to cheat, they were going to cheat, regardless of if they signed their name.” 
In Mr. Elkins’s opinion, the greatest downfall of SOX has been “the layer of bureaucracy that it 
added.” According to him, part of the problem was the accounting industry itself. It wasn’t that 
the government needed to be more vocal about what was already being done (Elkins). He 
believes that the best action the government could have taken would have been to simply make 
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small adjustments to the laws and regulations that were already in place. In Mr. Elkins’s opinion, 
“SOX, itself, was unnecessary. The assessment of internal controls was already there. The 
accounting industry dropped the ball, and then they let the feds squeeze in” (Elkins). 
 
Conclusion: 
 Sarbanes-Oxley has inarguably been one of the most important acts to be passed in the 
United States. SOX has affected the business industry as a whole, it has made adjustments to 
what auditors do, and it has also helped companies gain back the trust of its investors. Depending 
on who is talking, the opinions on SOX will undoubtedly vary making the conclusion of if 
Sarbanes-Oxley was the right choice hard to answer.  
 The implementation of SOX has been a learning process not only businesspeople, but 
also for the government. In the beginning, smaller companies were complaining about the 
increased, unsustainable cost of audits after the changes brought about from SOX. Due to these 
concerns, Congress passed the Small Business SOX Compliance Relief Act in 2009. This act 
required the SEC to modify some of the requirements enacted by SOX for exempt small 
businesses, especially with regard to “annual management assessments of, and reports on, 
internal financial controls” (“H.R. 3775- Small Business SOX Compliance Relief Act”). 
Although there will always be the debate about whether SOX enacted too much or not 
enough regulation, all-in-all there seems to be a general consensus that some form of a change 
needed to happen after the frauds of the early 2000’s. Although some people may believe there 
were other, more logical choices than passing SOX, accountants and businesspeople seem to 
appreciate the increased protection from fraud that SOX has brought with it. According to Ernst 
& Young, “at [the] ten year anniversary of Sarbanes-Oxley, corporate governance is stronger, 
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[and] audit quality is improved” (Tanna). In addition to Ernst & Young’s opinion, Kaya Gillan, a 
writer for The New York Times, states that the greatest effect of SOX has been that, 
Those who would seek to provide the market with misleading numbers are less likely to 
be able to do so because the public company internal controls are now much more 
effective; independent auditors comply with stronger standards and also have an 
independent regulator to oversee their efforts on behalf of investors and other 
stakeholders; audit committees must now be more competent and engaged in overseeing 
the audit and financial reporting; and the Securities and Exchange Commission must now 
spend more of its resources in reviewing the quality of information that companies 
provide to the market (Gillan). 
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